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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an Appeal from a decision by the Sunset City Appeal Board, dated April 17,
2007 to uphold a police officer's termination. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-3-1106(6)(a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the May 17,2007 decision of the Sunset City Appeals Board
(the "Appeals Board"), upholding the termination of Stewart Becker ("Becker"), a Sunset
City police officer. Becker was discharged from his job on April 4, 2007 for showing up to
work with a 0.045 blood alcohol level in violation of Sunset Police Department Policy and
Procedure Manual section 3-03-02.0, 1-01-04.00 and Sunset City Policy Manual section
4.2.4 (D). Record ("R") p. 128.
On April 5, 2007 Becker filed an appeal with the Appeals Board. R. 244. On April
10,2007 the Appeals Board sent by Registered Mail a letter providing notice that the hearing
on his appeal was scheduled for April 16, 2007. R. pp. 48, 157.
On April 16,2007 this hearing was held before the Appeals Board. Becker requested
a continuance based on inadequate notice and because he was not represented by counsel.
He claimed that he did not receive the letter until that morning. This request was denied.
During the hearing Becker and Ken Eborn, the Chief of Police ("Chief Eborn"),
offered testimony and evidence.
On April 17,2007 the Appeals Board issued a unanimous decision affirming Becker's
termination. R. 244.
On May 11,2007 Becker filed an appeal of the Board's decision with the Utah Court
of Appeals.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Stewart Becker ("Becker") had been a police officer for the Sunset City Police

Department for two years. Transcript of Appeal Proceedings 7 (hereafter referred to as "T").
The Events of April 1, 2007
2.

On April 1, 2007 Becker was required to work a "short shift", that required

him to get off work at 6 a.m. and report back at 2 p.m.
3.

On April 15 2007 Becker arrived on shift and met with Sergeant Arbogast

("Arbogast"). Arbogast "immediately" smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Becker when he
pulled up next to him. Arbogast told Becker that he could smell the alcohol on him. Officer
Becker admitted to taking two stiff drinks with about two and one half shots of liquor in each
before going to bed at approximately 8-9a.m. that morning. R. pp. 122,124-25.
4.

At this time Arbogast requested Becker to blow into a Portable Breath Test

("PBT"). Initially Becker thought Arbogast was j oking, but Arbogast told him he was serious
and went to get the PBT from his car. Becker grabbed his own PBT, which registered 0.045.
R. p. 122.
5.

Around this time Utah State Troopers Michelle McLaughlin ("McLaughlin")

and Arlow Hancock ("Hancock") arrived at the Sunset City Police Department to reset the
clock on the intoxilyzer machine.
6.

Hancock approached Becker's patrol car to inspect it? because he was shortly

going to receive the same model of car. He approached Becker and asked him how he liked
the vehicle. Hancock "immediately noticed the odor of alcohol coming from the inside of the
car." In addition he "found it unusual that the officer turned his head away when he talked
to [him]." When Hancock got closer and asked Becker questions about the car," [i]t was very
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apparent that the odor of alcohol was coming from the officer's breath.
7.

Hancock noticed that Becker was eating some mints and that he "retrieved a

dispenser of hand sanitizer and applied a generous amount to his hands." Hancock believed
he was doing this in an attempt to mask the odor of alcohol.
8.

Hancock "was concerned about the officer's ability to safely operate his

vehicle and handle calls." In addition, he was "concerned about the image that an officer
who had been drinking would portray to the public."
9.

Hancock stayed and talked to Becker while McLaughlin and Arbogast went

inside the building. On their return, McLaughlin made eye contact with Hancock and asked
if he had smelled what she had smelled. Hancock told her that he did.
10.

Hancock then approached Arbogast and told him that they "could smell the

odor of alcohol very strong" from Becker.
11.

Sgt. Arbogast indicated "he was aware of the problem." Arbogast stated that

someone was coming to pick up the officer and he was being relieved of duty for the day. In
addition, he told them that Becker would leave his vehicle at the department. R. after 141.
12.

Arbogast expressed embarrassment at the situation.

13.

Arbogast then contacted Chief Eborn, who told him to send Becker home and

to tell him that they would be meeting the next day to discuss disciplinary action against him.
Pre-Termination Meeting April 2,2007
14.

On April 2, 2007 a pre-termination hearing was conducted at the Sunset

Police Department R. p. 124.
The Meeting with Chief Eborn April 4,2007
15.

On April 4, 2007 Becker had a meeting with Chief Eborn where he was
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advised of his termination R. p. 128.
16.

A termination letter dated April 3,2007 was given to Becker which stated that

the "decision to terminate [was] made as a result of [Becker] reporting for duty on April 1,
2007 with a Blood Alcohol Content of .045 in violation of Sunset Police Department Policy
and Procedure Manual section 3-03-02.0,1 -01-04.00 and Sunset City Policy Manual section
4.2.4 (D).M
17.

In addition to this, the letter stated that Becker had a "right to grieve this

decision," and that a copy of the procedure was included in the letter.
18.

The process was explained as: 1) filing a written notice of the appeal within

10 days after the discharge; 2) Upon filing the appeal the city recorder would refer a copy to
the Appeal Board; 3) once the Appeal Board received this, the Board would commence its
investigation and receive evidence and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to
the cause for the discharge.
19.

In addition the letter explained Becker's rights.

Filing of Appeal April 5,2007
20.

On April 5, 2007 Becker filed an Appeal with the Board. R. 244.

Notice of Hearing April 10, 2007
21.

On April 10, 2007 the Sunset City Appeals Board, by Registered Mail, sent

Notice to Becker, informing him that the hearing on his appeal was scheduled for April 16,
2007. R. pp. 48,157.
22.

The letter stated that the purpose of the hearing would be to determine

whether the disciplinary action taken against Becker was justified and appropriate. And that
in making this determination they would consider:
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a.

whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision to
discipline employee;

b.

whether the employee was afforded due process in connection with
the discipline; and

c.

whether the level of discipline imposed was appropriate to the
situation.

Hearing April 16,2007
23.

On April 16, 2007 a hearing was held before the appeals board. The Mayor

of Sunset City, Timothy Isom, conducted the meeting. T.l.
24.

Becker requested a continuance based on inadequate notice and because he

was not represented by counsel. T. 1.
25.

According to Becker the letter came to his house on April 10,2007. "[T]here

was no one home to receive it so it sat in the post office." T. 1
26.

Becker stated: "Me nor my wife ever saw anything that there was a notice on

my door. I didn't, I wasn't, I didn't even know what the letter entailed." T. 2.
27.

Becker, however, agreed to go ahead with the proceedings, stating: "I'm more

than happy to proceed and present every bit of evidence that I've got now." T. 2
28.

Both Becker and Sunset City were given 30 minutes to present their case,

during which, the Board members could ask questions. Then each had 15 minutes to question
witnesses, present further evidence, and make a closing statement. T. 3
29.

Becker and the Chief of Police offered testimony.

30.

On April 17,2007 the Appeals Board issued its unanimous decision affirming

Becker's termination. (R. 244)
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31.

On May 11, 2007 Becker filed an Appeal of the Board's decision with the

Utah Court of Appeals.
Relevant Testimony to the level of Alcohol and the PBT
32.

Becker acknowledged that when he took the PBT the result was 0.045. R. p.

33.

On January 1,2006, Becker signed a form stating that he had "read the Sunset

172.

Police Department Policy Manual in its entirety", and that he had "discussed any questions
or concerns with the Chief of Police."
34.

Becker was aware of Sunset City personnel policies 14.7.1 (h) defining being

under the influence as having a blood alcohol content of .04 R. p. 172.
35.

Becker acknowledged a blood alcohol level of .12 before going to bed and

going to work five hours later. R. p. 173.
3 6.

Becker acknowledged that when he spoke with McLaughlin and Hancock on

April 1, 2007 that he used some hand sanitizer and breath mints in an attempt to help mask
the odor of alcohol. He admitted that he felt somewhat uncomfortable and knew they would
have noticed the odor. R. p. 122.
3 7.

Becker did not measure how much alcohol he put in each drink and admitted

it was possible that he could have had closer to four shots per drink. T. 19
38.

In looking at the amount of alcohol Becker had in his system he stated: "You

know, either, either way you look at by policy it, it's a state of intoxication." T. 5
39.

Becker previously acknowledged to Chief Eborn that in his usage of the PBT

it had proven to be accurate. R. pp. 126, 173.
40.

Becker admitted "I've found them to be close to 90% accurate." T.5
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41.

Also, Becker admitted to a drinking problem stating: "Yes, I do have a

problem with alcohol, but not in the typical sense of an alcoholic. It's more of a, it's similar
to like someone that has become dependent on sleeping pills ..." T. 8. "[I]t's a different type
of drinking problem." T. 10
The Decision to Terminate Becker
42.

The decision to terminate Becker was "not made hastily", the decision was

only made after discussing the incident with the Lieutenant and Sergeant of the department,
the City Attorney, and David Church (who participated in policy writing for Sunset City).
T. 17
43.

Chief Eborn stated that: "if the decision had been left solely up to me, had I

not gone to the City Attorney, had I not gone to the League Attorney,... I would have still
made the same decision." T. 25. "It clearly is a third level offense and I think that if you don't
act on what the policy says, then you open the door for any other employee of this City to say
well then I'm granted one big no-no." T.25.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant raises four (4) issues and makes three (3) points in his argument for
overturning the decision of the Appeals Board. These can be broken down into two main
issues; (1) did the Appeals Board abuse its discretion? and (2) was Becker denied due
process of law?
The answer to both of these question is "No". The Appeals board did not abuse its
discretion, and Becker was not denied due process of law.
The Appeals Board acted within its discretion and authority when it upheld the
discharging of Becker by Chief Eborn, when the facts supported the charges and the charges
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warranted the sanction. Becker registered a 0.045 on the PBT in violation of Sunset City
regulations. The Appellant admitted to this, and there was other strong evidence of Becker
being under the influence of alcohol. In addition, these charges also warrant the sanction
under City personnel policies. This was a third level disciplinary action, which almost always
leads to discharge.
The Appeals Board did not violate Becker's right to due process by denying his
untimely request for a postponement because Becker had constructive notice of the hearing
through requesting it, and actual notice by registered mail, which he voluntarily failed to pick
up. The Appeals Board, within its discretion and authority, denied the Appellant's request for
a postponement. Becker was given an opportunity to respond to the charges, and had no
disagreement with the facts of the case as presented.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In looking to other cases involving the review of a final order affirming an officer's
discharge from the police department, the Court of Appeals is limited to "determining if the
commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its authority." Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1012.5 (1996); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n. 908 P.2d
871,874 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm'n. 2000
UT App 235 (where the court of Appeals review of "the final decision of a city civil service
commission, upholding the police chiefs termination of a police officer for conduct
unbecoming an officer, only for the purpose of determining if the commission had abused
its discretion or exceeded its authority.")
"Unless city civil service commission has stepped out of arena of discretion and
thereby crossed the law, reviewing court will affirm commission's order." U.C.A.1953,
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§ 10-3-1012.5. Salt Lake City Corp. 908 P.2d at 875 (internal citations omitted); see e.g.
Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm'n.. 949 P.2d 746,751 ((Utah App. 1997); Erkman
v. Civil Service Commission of Provo City. 198 P.2d 238 (Utah 1948)(Supreme Court could
not disturb action of city civil service commission upholding the discharge of apolice officer
by police chief, unless decision of commission was not based on reason.)
'"Questions regarding whether an administrative agency afforded a petitioner due
process in its hearings are questions of law, which we review for correctness." Terry v.
Retirement Bd.. Public Employees' Health Program, 2007 UT App 87, 9; quoting (Sierra
Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd.. 964 P.2d 335,347 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPEALS BOARD ACTED WITHIN ITS
DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY WHEN IT UPHELD
THE DISCHARGE OF OFFICER BECKER, BECAUSE
THE FACTS SUPPORTED THE CHARGES AND THE
CHARGES WARRANTED THE SANCTION.
When an employee appeals his discharge, the Appeals Board must make two
inquiries: "(1) do the facts support the charges made by the department head, and, if so, (2)
do the charges warrant the sanction imposed?" Kelly. 2000 UT App 235 16 quoting In re
Discharge of Jones. 720 P.2d 1356,1361 (Utah 1986).
In these enquiries the Board is given broad discretion and unless the "city civil service
commission has stepped out of [the] arena of discretion and thereby crossed the law, [the]
reviewing court will affirm commission's order." U.C.A.1953,10-3-1012.5; Salt Lake City
Corp. 908 P.2d 871 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted).
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In this case, the Appeals Board acted within its discretion and authority when; (1) the
PBT was authorized by Chief Eborn who is a designee under §14.2.1; (2) the PBT was an
acceptable test for non-criminal disciplinary action; (3) the PBT was admissible as evidence
in the appeal hearing; (4) there was substantial evidence to support the charges; and (5) the
charges and actions of Becker warranted the sanction imposed. These are all addressed in
turn.
1.

The Chief Of Police who is a Designee under § 14.2.1 authorized the use

of the PBT test.
The Appellant contends that no one with authority authorized the use of the PBT test
because only the City Administrative Assistant or his designee could do so. Sunset City
Personnel, Policies and Procedures state: "All drug testing and results obtained under the
requirements of this policy will be coordinated with and authorized by the City
Administrative Assistant or his/her designee." § 14.2.1 (emphasis added) (hereafter referred
to as the "Sunset Policies and Procedures").
Sunset City no longer has a City Administrative Assistant and it is not explained in
the Sunset Policies and Procedures who the designee should be. Sunset City's policies leave
the door open for City officials to coordinate or authorize drug or alcohol testing. The Sunset
policies and Procedures clearly state, "they are not necessarily all inclusive" and that," Sunset
City Corporation may vary from the rules/procedures listed if, in its opinion, the
circumstances require." § 4.3.2. Surely, Sunset City wants someone to monitor the police
department and to control their drug and alcohol testing. The Sunset policies and Procedures
guide us by stating that "in each case of misconduct or unsatisfactory performance, the
appropriate disciplinary action will be determined on the basis of the particular facts and
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circumstances.1' Id.
Chief Eborn, as the department head, is the most appropriate person for this role.
Additionally, Sunset Policies and Procedures state that the Police Chief is the best person to
determine whether conduct meets the requirements of the job. § 4.3.2. Section 4.3.2 states:
"Employment with the Sunset City Cooperation is subject to meeting the performance and
conduct requirements of the described job to the satisfaction of the department
supervisor." (emphasis added) The department supervisor in this case is the Chief of Police.
This Court has ruled that the most appropriate person to coordinate testing and
discipline of the police department is the Police Chief. See Huemiller v. Ogden Civil Service
Comm'n, 2004 UT App 375, at 4. In Huemiller, this Court held that the chief of police "must
have the ability to manage and direct his officers and is in the best position to know whether
their actions merit discipline." 2004 UT App 375, at 4; quoting (Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil
Serv. Comm'n. 2000 UT App 235, 22). The role of the Chief of Police clearly makes him
the appropriate designee under these circumstances. Chief Eborn must be able to coordinate
drug and alcohol testing of his officers.
Chief Eborn was aware of the PBT test and determined that it was acceptable. He did
not do this capriciously, but he contacted other personnel and police departments to
determine if it was acceptable. The Police Chief must be able to make this decision. It is
allowed by the Sunset Policies and Procedures, especially since the rules are not all inclusive,
and adapt to the given circumstances and facts of the case.
2.

The PBT was an Acceptable Test when it was used for a Non-Criminal

Disciplinary Action.
The Appellant claims that the definition of alcohol testing in the Sunset Policies and
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Procedures does not include PBT tests, and therefore is unusable as a basis for disciplinary
action. Sunset Policies and Procedures. §14.7.1(c), defines drug/alcohol testing as "an
analysis of urine specimen provided by the employee." The Appellant claims that a PBT is
not a urine test so it is inadmissible. However this section must be viewed in context of the
whole of Sunset City Policies and Procedures.
As previously discussed, the Sunset Policies and Procedures, § 4.3.2, state: "The
procedures set out below are as complete as Sunset City can reasonably make them." Id.
"However, they are not necessarily all inclusive." "Sunset City Corporation may vary from
the rules/procedures listed if, in its opinion, the circumstances require." Id.
In addition §14.7.1(c) is not the only definition given in the Sunset Policies and
Procedures dealing with drug/alcohol tests. Section 14.7.1 (d) defines a "positive test" as any
test result showing a blood alcohol content of .02 or greater, or the presence of any
controlled substance in the test subject. Section 14.7.1(h) defines under the influence as an
employee "whose test detects a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) of 0.04 or greater."
Section 14.7.1(d) uses the words "any test." Even if the PBT test was not explicitly
stated as a form of testing, § 4.3.2 shows that it is not all-inclusive, and the designee in
charge of authorizing tests, Chief Eborn, authorized it.
An officer under the influence of alcohol is a serious situation. Under this situation
Sunset City "may vary from the rules/procedures listed if, in its opinion, the circumstances
require." Id. When a PBT shows that an officer of the law is under the influence of alcohol,
it cannot be discarded and ignored.
3.

The PBT was Admissible as Evidence in the Hearing
Becker repeatedly stated that PBT tests are not admissible in court. However, Utah
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Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1994) provides that "[njeither the Commission nor its hearing
examiner shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence."
The Appellant claims that R714-500-4 Regulation of the State of Utah makes this test
inadmissible. This section states that "[a] 11 breath alcohol testing instruments employed by
Utah law enforcement officers, to be used for evidentiary purposes, shall be approved by the
department." This section is irrelevant since it is dealing with evidence for criminal trials and
not the discharging of a police officer.
Utah courts have long acknowledged the "universal acceptance of the reliability of
[breathalyzer] evidence," Lavton City v. Watson 733 P.2d 499, 500 (Utahl987) citing
Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah 1983). In addition, many cases have
distinguished between the validity of, and admissibility of a PBT in a criminal proceeding
and that of an administrative hearing, and found PBT's acceptable as evidence in
administrative and other hearings, even though it is inadmissible in a criminal trial. See
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Coleman. 787 So.2d 90,92 (Fla. App.
2 Dist.,2001); Moore v. State. Motor Vehicles Div. of Oregon Dept. of Transp.. 652 P.2d
794, 797 (Or. 1982) (where court found the case "distinguishable in that it is a criminal case
regarding suppression or admissibility of evidence, whereas these cases present a civil review
of the legality of administrative action") see also Frazee v. Civil Service Bd. of City of
Oakland. 170 Cal. App. 2d 333, 334-35, 338 P.2d 943 (1st Dist. 1959); (where refusal of
officer to comply with lie-detector test justified discharge, notwithstanding that such tests are
not admissible in evidence in the courts of the state.); Ewtushek v. Township of Old Bridge,
2005 WL 1583075 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), (where the court affirmed the
termination of an officer particularly for refusing two PBTs on two separate occasions).
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In addition, Utah courts have held PBTs admissible because "if an officer
administering the test has any qualms as to the accuracy of the test, he is free to administer
further tests." Layton City, 733 P.2d at 500. This is even stronger when a police officer gives
himself a PBT. If he thinks it is inaccurate he can try a different machine or take another test
to disprove it. This was not done in this case. Becker had used a PBT frequently and yet he
did not, in an attempt to clear himself, take another type of test.
Becker acknowledged to Chief Ebom that in his usage of the PBT it had proven to
be accurate. R. pp. 126,173. Becker admitted "I've found them to be close to 90% accurate."
T.5.
The PBT is appropriate evidence in the non-criminal discharging of a police officer
for being under the influence of alcohol. The courts have allowed it in administrative
proceedings, and most persuasive in this case was the ability of the Appellant, a police
officer, to take other tests, which he chose not to do.
4.

There Was Substantial Evidence to Support the Charge
There was substantial evidence to support Becker's discharge. Most importantly and

dispositive is the Appellant's own testimony. Becker admitted that when he took the PBT,
the result was 0.045. R. p. 172. Becker acknowledged a blood alcohol level of .12 before
going to bed and going to work five hours later. R. p. 173. He admitted that he did not
measure how much alcohol he put in each drink and admitted it was possible that he could
have had closer to four shots per drink. T. 19. Becker stated: "You know, either, either way
you look at by policy it, it's a state of intoxication." T. 5.
We have the record of three officers noticing the smell of alcohol immediately, and
becoming concerned. The court in Holloman v. Bolen, 13 S.E.2d 881,883 (Ga. App. 1941),
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found the testimony of several officers who noticed the defendant officer's odor and eyes,
was sufficient evidence that the officer was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. "The
testimony of police officers was to the effect that, from close contact with the defendant, and
from observation and from smelling his breath and observing his eyes, he was under the
'influence of intoxicating' liquor, but that he was not drunk." Id. This evidence "was
sufficient to authorize the police committee to find that the defendant at the time referred to,
had been under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Id. Becker knew that he smelled of
alcohol and admitted that he used hand sanitizer and breath mints in an attempt to mask the
odor of alcohol. R. p. 122. In spite of these attempts to cover up the smell three (3) officers
noticed it immediately and became concerned.
Also, Becker admitted to a drinking problem stating: "Yes, I do have a problem with
alcohol, but not in the typical sense of an alcoholic. It's more of a, it's similar to like someone
that has become dependent on sleeping pills ..." T. 8. "[Ijt's a different type of drinking
problem." T. 10
In the current case there was substantial evidence that Becker was under the influence
of alcohol. The Appellant, himself, admitted it. The evidence was so strong that all six (6)
of the Appeal Board members unanimously voted to uphold the termination.
5»

The Charges Warrant the Sanction Imposed
Because Sunset City has a strong commitment towards maintaining a strong

reputation, running the city efficiently, and the importance of police officers and the trust put
in them, an officer being under the influence at work warrants his discharge.
The commitment that Sunset City has towards its reputation, especially the police
department, can be seen in their Policies, Regulations, and Statements.
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1.01.01-0 Mission Statement of the Police Department
We at the Sunset Police Department are proud of our heritage. We
acknowledge that our reputation as an outstanding law enforcement agency
has been accomplished through the hard work and dedication of our
employees.
1-01-08.00 Sunset Police Department Value Statement
... A commitment to the highest ideals of honor and integrity to maintain the
respect and confidence of their government officials, subordinates, the public,
and their fellow law enforcement officers..."
In order to achieve this the City has issued rules of conduct.
4.3.1 Rules of Conduct
4.3.2 Policy
"Employment with the Sunset City Corporation is subject to meeting the
performance and conduct requirements of the described job to the satisfaction
of the department supervisor. Employees who fail to satisfy these
requirements will be subject to disciplinary action which can range from
warning notices to termination. In each case of misconduct or unsatisfactory
performance, the appropriate disciplinary action will be determined on the
basis of the particular facts and circumstances."
In addition, the City of Sunset came out with a strong stance on substance abuse.
Section 4.3.3(I)(i) states that Sunset City employees who report to work with detectable
levels of alcohol "will be subject to disciplinary action, which may include termination." In
1998, the City adopted a Substance Abuse Prevention Program, which once again reiterated
that "[e]mployees of Sunset City have the responsibility to arrive at work free from the
effects of drugs, alcohol, and other job impairing substances."
In order to enforce these rules and procedures the City adopted a progressive
disciplinary system:
4.2.4 Employee Discipline
a. Sunset City is committed to a fair and equitable progressive disciplinary
system. Management has both the right and responsibility to correct and/or
discipline staff for misconduct, errors or inappropriate behavior or actions
which adversely affect the operations and/or the reputation of Sunset City,
d. Third level offenses are the most serious offenses and may result in
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discharge after the first offense. Examples of third-level offenses are:
1. Working or being on the job while under the influence of alcohol,
narcotics, or other drugs;
e. Discipline Procedure
3. Third Level Offenses
a. Third level offenses are the most serious offenses and usually lead to
termination.
(emphasis added)
Due to the importance of substance abuse control, and the image and role that the police play
in the community, it was proper for Chief Eborn to discharge Becker.
This Court has held that the police chief has the discretion of how to proceed in
disciplining an officer, "because the police chief must have the ability to manage and direct
his officers, and the police chief [is] in the best position to know whether the officer's actions
merited discipline." Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, 22 see also fHuemiller 2004 UT App 375,4).
There are several cases of officers being let go for being under the influence but not
intoxicated, even when not showing up for duty. See e.g. Becker v. Merrill 20 So. 2d 912
(Fla. 1944) (The court held that a city police chief, while in uniform, but not on duty, and
under the influence of intoxicants, but not intoxicated when involved in an accident, was
guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer, and discharge was appropriate.). Courts have even
gone as far as not requiring that the officer's conduct even violate a particular rule. See
Appeal of Emmons, 164 A.2d 184,187 (App. Div. 1960) ("Nor need afindingof misconduct
be predicated upon the violation of any particular rule or regulation, but may be based merely
upon the violation of the implicit standard of good behavior which devolves upon one who
stands in the public eye as an upholder of that which is morally and legally correct.")
Chief Eborn, in his testimony, stated that the decision to terminate Becker was "not
made hastily", the decision was only made after discussing the incident with the Lieutenant
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and Sergeant of the police department, the City Attorney, and David Church (who
participated in policy writing for Sunset City). T. 17.
Chief Eborn stated that: "if the decision had been left solely up to me, had I not gone
to the City Attorney, had I not gone to the League Attorney,... I would have still made the
same decision." T. 25. "It clearly is a third level offense and I think that if you don't act on
what the policy says, then you open the door for any other employee of this City to say well
then I'm granted one big no-no." T.25.
Chief Eborn appropriately used his discretion and discharged Becker. It was a serious
third level offense, and he felt he had to make that decision.
POINT II
THE APPEALS BOARD DID NOT VIOLATE
BECKER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BECAUSE
BECKER RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE HEARING,
HIS REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE WAS NOT
TIMELY, HE WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO
RESPOND TO THE CHARGES, AND THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE IN THIS CONTEXT ARE DIFFERENT
THAN IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
Although the exact requirements of due process may vary from situation to situation,
the minimum requirements of due process include adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard in a meaningful manner. Dairy Prod. Serv. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81 49. "To
be considered a meaningful hearing, the concerns of the affected parties should be heard by
an impartial decision maker." Dairy Prod. Serv., 2000 UT 81 at 49.
To guide them in the discipline of employees the City of Sunset adopted the
following regulation:
10-3-1106 Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer
-Appeals - Board - Procedure.
(4) An employee who is the subject of discharge, suspension, or transfer may:
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(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel; (b) have a public hearing;
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and (d) examine
the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(5)(a)(i) Each decision for the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall
be certified to the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred
to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii)
(emphasis added)
The Appellant claims that he did not receive due process of law. However, (1) Becker
received actual notice, and/or constructive notice; (2) the Board of Appeals appropriately and
within its discretion denied an untimely request for a continuance; (3) the rules of evidence
in the appeals hearing allowed the PBT and other evidence; (4) Becker confronted his
accuser, Chief Ebora and Becker himself admitted to the PBT results.
1.

Becker Received Notice
"Due process requires the government to provide 'notice reasonably calculated, under

all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.'" Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226
(2006); quoting (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
"Due process does not require that a property owner receive actual notice before the
government may take his property." Jones, 547 U.S. at 226; citing fDusenbery v. United
States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002).
The Appellant cites Jones as showing that notice was not served in the current case.
However, in Jones it is found that even if there is no actual notice, due process has been
served if the methods were reasonable. Jones, 547 U.S. at 226. The means of contacting
Becker in the current case were reasonable under the circumstances. In this case it was
registered mail to the Appellant's Home.
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Becker had actual and constructive notice of the hearing. He filed the Appeal
knowing that there were only 15 days for the Appeals Board to act; he knew what the appeal
was for. The courts have long held;
Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard
and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have
led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall
be deemed conversant of it.
Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. Courtesy Motors. Inc., 333 P.2d 628, 629 (1959); quoting (Wood
Y, Carpenter. 101 U.S. 135, 141 (1879)).
The presumption is that if the party affected... might, with ordinary care and
attention, have seasonably detected it, he seasonably had actual knowledge
of it.
Wood, 101 U.S. at 141 (Emphasis Added).
At the very least, Becker had constructive notice and was aware of the hearing
because he requested it. He knew the subject matter of the hearing. He knew he had the right
to counsel. He knew the Board decision had to be made within 15 days from the time of the
referral (policy 1-15-4). On top of this, Becker received notice of a registered letter and
voluntarily failed to pick it up.
In addition, there was no harm to Becker because of the mode of notice. In Lucas the
court in analyzing the ineffectiveness of the notice found that still Lucas had not established
"how these procedural errors were harmful, e.g., he did not have time to prepare for the
hearing or, how these procedures would have resulted in a different outcome absent such
errors. Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746,755 (Utah App. 1997) see,
e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) cf. State v. Knight 734
P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987) (M[T]he likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently
high to undermine confidence in [the decision]."); State v. Villarreal 857 P.2d 949, 958
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(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating evidence must be "sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude
there is no 'reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings' "
(quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)), aff d, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995).
Becker knew that he did not have much time to meet with a lawyer, yet he put it off until a
few days before the 15-day period expired. Even if he had received the letter, he still had his
appointment set for after the hearing.
Becker had actual and constructive notice of the hearing. Becker received actual
notice through a registered letter, which, once again, he voluntarily failed to pick up. He had
constructive notice because he filed the appeal knowing that there were only 15 days for the
Appeals Board to act; he knew what the appeal was for, he knew what the charges were.
Becker's failure to prepare sufficiently does not remove the fact that he had sufficient notice
of the hearing.
2.

The Appeals Board within its Discretion and Authority, Denied the

Appellant's request for a Continuance.
Sunset City regulations state that "[f]or good cause the board may extend the 15-day
period under Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and municipality
both consent." (5)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). This states that for good cause the Appeals Board
may extend the deadline. However, trial courts have a great deal of discretion in granting a
continuance, and this discretion should be even greater in administrative dealings. Brown v.
Glover, clearly explains the standard for discretion in granting continuances.
However, "[t]rial courts have substantial discretion in deciding whether
to grant continuances," Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375,1377 (Utah
1988), and their decision will not be overturned unless that discretion has
been clearly abused, see State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408,413 (Utah 1993).
Furthermore, a party is not necessarily entitled to a continuance because
counsel is unable to be present on the date set for trial. See Griffiths v.
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Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1977); see also Lundgreen v..
Lundgreen, 184 P.2d 670, 671-72 (1947) (affirming denial of continuance
when attorney in law firm had conflict and claimed no other members of firm
could familiarize themselves in adequate time); 16 P.3d 540, 548 -549
(Utah,2000) (emphasis added)
The Appellant correctly states that good cause is a "special circumstance" that was
beyond the party's control. In re General Determination of Rights to Use of Water, 2008 UT
25, 35; citing (Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106, 41). However, in the current
case there was no good cause. The Appellant knew of the pendency of the hearing before the
Appeals Board, he should have been preparing for it during this time. In any case, he had the
ability to contact the City sooner to find out the date of the hearing. He knew there would
soon be a hearing, but he did not actually retain a lawyer to represent him.
In addition, like a trial court, the Appeals Board has " substantial discretion in
deciding whether to grant continuances and will not be reversed on appeal unless it has
abused that discretion by acting unreasonably." Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585,586 (Utah
App.1993) quoting Hill v. Dickerson. 839 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah App.1992) (citations
omitted).
The Appeals Board is the best judge of the reason for not granting a continuance and
in determining the credibility of the Appellant in his testimony. During the hearing, Becker
made several confusing statements that the Appeals Board had to interpret. For example,
I
Becker confusingly stated: "Me nor my wife ever saw anything that there was a notice on my
door. I didn't, I wasn't, I didn't even know what the letter entailed." T. 2.
In addition to his confusing statements, Becker agreed to go ahead with the
proceedings, stating: "I'm more than happy to proceed and present every bit of evidence that
I've got now." T. 2
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According to long held precedent, it is well within the discretion and authority of the
Appeals Board to deny a continuance, especially when no good cause is shown.
3.

Hearsay Evidence is Allowed in the Appeals Board Hearings
In Point Two of the Appellant's brief the Appellant claims that PBT is a written

statement within Section 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and Hearsay.
However Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1994) provides that "[njeither the Commission nor its
hearing examiner shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence."
Therefore, hearsay evidence, even if objected to, is admissible in an administrative hearing
before the Commission. Industrial Power Contractors v. Industrial Comm'n, 832 P.2d 477,
478 (Utah App.1992). However, the Commission's findings of fact "cannot be based
exclusively on hearsay evidence." Industrial Power Contractors, 832 P.2d at 479; citing
Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n. 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984) (emphasis
in original). To support the Commission's findings, "there must be a residuum of evidence,
legal and competent in a court of law." Industrial Power Contractors, 832 P.2d at 479;
quoting Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n. 358 P.2d 899, 901 (Utah 1961).
There was substantial evidence presented to easily fulfill this small requirement of
having a "residuum of evidence." See Supra 4. There was substantial evidence of the charge.
Most importantly we have Becker's own admission that he blew a 0.045 on the PBT; together
with his admission of drinking, his efforts to mask the odor and the observations of three (3)
police officers.

Since the Utah Rules of Evidence do not apply in this situation, this

evidence is admissible.
4.

Confronting Witnesses
As previously discussed, the minimum requirements of due process include adequate
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notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. Dairy Prod. Serv., 2000 UT
81 at 49. "To be considered a meaningful hearing, the concerns of the affected parties should
be heard by an impartial decision maker." Dairy Prod. Serv., 2000 UT 81 at 49. This was
granted to Becker. Becker was heard by the Appeals board and had sufficient time to make
his case. In addition there is not even a hint that Becker wanted to confront any of the officers
on their reports or testimony. Becker knew that he had blown a 0.045 on the PBT, he merely
argued that it was inadmissible, and that discharge was a severe punishment. Nowhere did
he state or even imply that he thought any of the officers lied or left out important details of
incident. In all the record there is no assertion of bias in the firing or of any of the officers
lying. Becker merely argued against the policies. Becker's recollection of the events did not
conflict at all with that of the officer's reports and Becker never contested any of them. Most
importantly, Becker admitted that when he took the PBT, the result was 0.045. R. p. 172.
Becker stated: "You know, either, either way you look at by policy it, it's a state of
intoxication." Furthermore, he confronted and cross-examined Chief Eborn, his accuser who
made the decision to discharge him.
Becker did not show how any of his complaints resulted in harm to him.
CONCLUSION
Becker was under the influence of alcohol when he showed up to work on the
afternoon of April 1, 2007. Because of this, he was discharged pursuant to the Policies and
Procedures of Sunset City. The Appeals Board acted within its discretion and authority when
it upheld the discharging of Becker by Chief Eborn. Becker admitted to having blown a
0.045 in violation of Sunset City regulations. In addition the Appellant admitted this guilt
and admitted to being over the limit on the PBT. This was a third level disciplinary action,
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which almost always leads to discharge, as it did with Becker.
In addition, the Appeals Board did not violate Becker's right to due process when
Becker received notice of the hearing, through requesting it, and by registered mail, which
he failed to pick up. The Appeals Board within its discretion and authority denied the
Appellant's untimely request for a continuance.
Becker was given an opportunity to respond to the charges. Statements of the PBT
were admissible since the rules of evidence in this context are different than in judicial
proceedings. Becker admitted to having blown a 0.045 in violation of Sunset City
regulations and was therefore discharged.
In light of the preceding arguments, this Court should rule in favor of the City and
uphold the decision of the Sunset City Board of Appeals to uphold the discharge of Becker.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on 22nd day of December, 2008.
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Attorneys for Appellee
^-^

25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that this 22nd day of December, 2008, two (2) copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed to the following:
JERRALD D. CONDER, Esq.
The Felt Building
341 South Main Street, Suite 406
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

FELSHAW KING, ES(
Attorney for Appellee

26

